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Introduction

This paper analyzes optimal fiscal policies in economies with tax evasion. For most governments, tax evasion is a problem because it threats the equity and the eﬃciency of their
fiscal policies [Cowell (1985), Skinner and Slemrod (1985)].1 For this reason, governments
react and adopt actions to assure compliance with the tax law. For example, audits are
conducted to verify whether tax liabilities have been met and, if it is not the case, evaders
are penalized.
However, this ‘enforcement approach’ is not suﬃcient to deal with tax evasion. As the
public finance literature shows, the fight against tax evasion cannot be isolated from the
design of the fiscal policy; the extent of tax evasion depends not only on the parameters that
characterize the enforcement policy carried out by the tax administration (e.g. frequency of
audits, level of fines) but also upon the structure of the tax law (e.g. tax rates). Therefore,
as suggested by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and then emphasized by Kolm (1973), the
design of optimal fiscal policies or ‘optimal tax systems’ (in Slemrod’s (1990) terminology)
should also include all instruments that help to enforce the tax law.
Since Sandmo (1981), many articles have analyzed, in diﬀerent settings, optimal taxenforcement policies.2 All share a feature: the cost of a single audit or the shape of the
audit cost function3 is exogenous. The purpose of this paper is to relax this assumption,
for the following two reasons. From a theoretical point of view, in modern microeconomic
models costs are often endogenous because agents adopt decisions to change them [see
Tirole (1988)]. Moreover, adopting such decisions is not only a theoretical possibility but,
as the following paragraph illustrates, it also has a strong empirical support: governments
do invest resources to reduce the enforcement cost of the tax law.
In 1998, the US Congress created a special ‘Information Technology Investment’ account, to fund IRS modernization activities [The President’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting (1998)]. With these funds, in 1999, the IRS launched ‘Business Systems
Modernization’, an ambitious multianual project to modernize its information technology
infrastructure [see IRS (2000)]. One of the pillars of this (ongoing) project is the change
of its main data system, called the Master File system. This system was developed in
the 1960s and consists of large tape files stocked in one of the IRS’s computer centers in
Martinsburg (West Virginia). It stores the taxpaying histories of 227 million individuals
and corporations, including every transaction between taxpayers and the IRS for the past
40 years [see Varon (2004)]. Among others, the Master File system has an important drawback. The entire process the IRS needs to enter account data into the Master File and
make the updated information available for researching taxpayer accounts can take from 4
1

One can get a good idea about the quantitative importance of tax evasion by looking at the US example.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated a tax gap for tax year 2001 of U$D 345 billion (IRS, 2006).
This amounts to almost 15% of total tax revenue, which is far from being a negligeable figure.
2
Among others, we can cite Usher (1986), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987), Border and Sobel (1987),
Mookherjee and Png (1989), Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990), Kaplow (1990), Mayshar (1991),
Sanchez and Sobel (1993), Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (1994, 2004), Slemrod (1994), Cremer and Gahvari
(1994, 1995), Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín (1997) and Chander and Wilde (1998).
3
In some models [e.g. Cowell (1985)], the cost of a single audit is a function of the number of audits
conducted.

1

to 6 weeks [US General Accounting Oﬃce (1999)]. Because of these delays, IRS employees
frequently have inconsistent and out-of-date information about a given taxpayer. Under
these circumstances, conducting timely audits and going after tax evaders is extremely
diﬃcult. The Business Systems Modernization project will replace the Master File system
with the Customer Account Data Engine (CADE), which will allow IRS’s employees to
post changes and update taxpayers accounts and returns from their desks. As a result,
according to IRS (2005), audit costs should decrease.4
Investments made by governments to modernize their tax administration have been
either mentioned informally [e.g. Snavely (1988) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002)] or
studied empirically [e.g. Hunter and Nelson (1996)]. But, to our knowledge, they have not
been incorporated into the formal analysis of optimal fiscal policies so far.5 We address
this issue in a simple three-stage model, with two classes of active agents: individuals
and a government. Each individual can be poor or rich; the rich being the only to earn
a taxable income. The government follows a social welfare criterion that incorporates
aversion to inequality. In order to maximize its criterion, the government designs a fiscal
policy, to be implemented by the tax administration. In the first stage of the model, the
government invests resources to ‘modernize’ the tax administration. In the second stage,
the government designs the tax law, which specifies the tax owed by the rich and the
enforcement policy to be conducted later by the tax administration. We assume that the
government has the ability to commit to this policy. Finally, in the last stage of the model,
the tax administration collects taxes and enforces the tax law, as follows. As incomes are
private information, individuals are requested to report them. Then, the tax administration
audits reports according to the frequency pre-specified by the government and, known to
individuals. If an audit discovers that a taxpayer has misreported, the tax administration
taxes the evader according to his true income and imposes him an additional fine. With
all revenues collected (taxes and fines, net of investment and audit costs), the government
finances the provision of a public good. As in many other contributions to the literature on
tax evasion, we assume that audits are perfect but costly. The main novelty of this paper
is the formalization of the audit cost as a decreasing function of the investment and its
productivity.
As a benchmark, we derive first the optimal fiscal policy under full information, when
enforcement is not necessary. Then we move to asymmetric information and we solve the
model backwards. As the government can commit to the tax and to the enforcement policy
to be conducted in the third stage, in the second stage we characterize the optimal tax law
adopting a mechanism design approach. Depending upon the value of the audit cost, two
regimes emerge. In the first regime, when the audit cost is low, the tax administration only
audits individuals that have reported to be poor. In order to attenuate the stake for evasion
of the rich, the optimal tax is downwardly distorted with respect to the full information
optimal tax. We show that the optimal tax and the audit probability decrease with the
4

Snavely (1988) shows that, by the end of the 80s, many US States had already invested in computer
technology to improve auditing.
5
Alm (1996) asserts that there is a lack of analysis regarding the shape of the audit cost function. In the
conclusion of their survey, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) consider the rigorous study of the tax collection
technology as one of the main venues for future research in the economic literature on tax evasion.
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audit cost. As is usual in this kind of models, the optimal fine has only a deterrent role and
is maximal. In the second regime, the audit cost is so high that the government prefers not
to tax and so no enforcement takes place. Anticipating these decisions, in the first stage, the
government chooses whether to invest in the tax administration to reduce its audit cost and,
if so, how much to invest. This choice has an impact not only on the expected social welfare
(because tax revenues are allocated to investment instead of being allocated to the public
good) but can also fix under which regime the government and the tax administration will
be afterwards. Although we prove that an optimal investment exists, we cannot completely
characterize it in general, due to the non-concavity of the problem. When the optimal
investment is strictly positive, the levels of the tax, the audit probability and the public
good are higher than their respective levels without investment. Under this circumstance,
we can derive some comparative statics results: optimal investment increases with taxable
income and with the degree of aversion to inequality, but decreases with the cost of the
public good.
Then, we simulate numerically the model to identify the optimal investment, to quantify
the other components of the optimal fiscal policy (and see their relation with the optimal
level of investment) and to confirm the comparative statics results mentioned above. The
simulations show that incorporating the modernization of the tax administration in a model
of optimal tax-enforcement policies modifies its results substantially. First, the simulations
clarify the relation between investment and expenditures in audit. Although investment
reduces the cost of each individual audit, the aggregate audit cost can increase. Moreover,
investment and aggregate audit cost can be substitutes or complements. Second, the two
diﬀerent ways of modifying the income distribution (i.e. a change in the fraction of rich in
the population or their taxable income) do not have the same impact upon the optimal level
of investment. Finally, all simulations show that the public sector becomes more eﬃcient:
the fraction of tax collection used to provide public goods increases.

1.1

Related literature

From a methodological point of view, our model is a simplified version of Mookherjee and
Png (1989) and Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (2004). These authors assume that pre-tax
incomes are exogenous and that taxes are lump-sum, like we do. Moreover, they also assume
that individuals are risk averse.6 Finally, adopting the mechanism design approach, they
characterize optimal tax-enforcement policies. But, besides the fact that these authors take
the audit cost as given, our model diﬀers with theirs on two important aspects. First, we
rule out of the model rewards for truthful reports, whereas Mookherjee and Png (1989) find
that they are indeed optimal deterrents for tax evasion. Second, we include in the model the
provision of public goods, whereas they follow the traditional ‘optimal taxation’ approach
that fixes exogenously the government’s revenue requirement. Our results at the second
stage are similar to theirs, but neither of them obtain analytic solutions and comparative
statics results for the optimal tax law, as we do.
Incorporating the provision of public goods into the design of optimal fiscal policies in
6

Border and Sobel (1987) also find optimal tax enforcement policies, but in a context where individuals
are risk neutral.
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a context of tax evasion makes our paper similar to Kolm (1973), Gottlieb (1985), Usher
(1986), Kaplow (1990), Falkinger (1991), Mayshar (1991), Sanchez and Sobel (1993) and
Balestrino and Galmarini (2003). However these articles do not include investments to
modernize the tax administration in their analysis, whereas it is our main contribution.
The interaction of these two features of the model enable us to analyze the eﬃciency of the
public sector taken as a whole.
We are not the first to address administrative and technological issues in optimal taxation models. Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) analyze optimal tax systems when the government controls an administrative instrument that directly aﬀects the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to tax rates. Our model adopts a diﬀerent indirect approach: investment aﬀects utilities but only via the optimal tax law, that ultimately depends upon the
level of the audit cost. Regarding the tax administration’s technology, Usher (1986) and
Mayshar (1991) have already dealt with this item. These authors characterize the optimal amount of resources spent by governments in tax enforcement activities. To do that,
they rely on reduced-form functions and assume a positive relation between these resources
and the cost borne by individuals to escape from being detected (Usher)/the maximal tax
collection (Mayshar)7 . While these positive relations seem logical, our numerical results
show that, when one incorporates investments that improve the cost structure of the tax
administration in the model, the signs of these relations become less evident.
Finally, our model sheds new light on the question of the size and the composition of
the tax administration’s budget. Like many others [e.g. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) and
Slemrod (1994)], we take the budget of the audit section for the budget of the entire tax
administration. By incorporating investment as another element of the tax administration’s
budget, we can show first that the relation between the audit probability and the tax
administration’s budget is not so direct as in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987). Second, we can
argue about the composition of this budget, as in Wertz (1979). In particular, we can see
whether the investment is substitute or complement to the aggregate audit cost, the other
element of the tax administration’s budget.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the model
and shows the optimal fiscal policy under full information. Section 3 analyzes the optimal
fiscal policy under asymmetric information. Section 4 presents the numerical results of our
model and highlights the diﬀerences with respect to those obtained in a model without
investment in the tax administration. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All proofs appear in
the Appendix.

2

The model

We formalize the design and the implementation of a fiscal policy in a simple three-stage
model, with two classes of active agents: a government and individuals.
There is a continuum of individuals of measure 1. Each individual can be of two
diﬀerent types ι ∈ {p, r}. A ‘poor’ individual (ι = p) has no income whereas a ‘rich’
7

In Mayshar’s (1991) words, these reduced-form functions are ‘black boxes’.
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individual (ι = r) earns a strictly positive taxable income y. Types are random variables,
identically and independently distributed according to the (commonly known) probability
distribution (µ, 1 − µ), where µ = Pr[ι = r] > 0.8 Each individual privately knows his type.
Poor individuals only benefit from a public good, provided by the government, in quantity G. Their ex-post welfare is given by
wp = G
Rich individuals also derive utility from consumption of a private good q, the price of which
is normalized to 1. So their ex-post welfare is
wr = u(q) + G
where the utility function u is strictly increasing, concave and verifies the Inada conditions.9
The government follows a welfarist criterion W that can be represented by a weighted
sum of the individuals’ welfares, as follows
W = µwr + (1 − µ)wp − µ(1 − α)(wr − wp )
= αµu(q) + G
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a parameter that measures preferences for redistribution.10 To be more
specific, the government is averse to inequality, with a degree of aversion proportional to
(1 − α). In order to maximize its criterion, the government designs a fiscal policy, to be
implemented by the tax administration.
The order of events, and relevant features of the model in more detail, are as follows.
1. In the first stage, the government invests I to ‘modernize’ the tax administration.
2. In the second stage, the government designs the tax law, which specifies the tax t ≥ 0
owed by rich individuals (from now on, taxpayers) and the enforcement policy to
be conducted afterwards by the tax administration. The enforcement policy consists
specifically of an audit probability π ∈ [0, 1] and a fine for evaders f ≥ 0. The unique
restriction to this tax law is limited liability of taxpayers.
3. In the third stage, the tax law is implemented. As the tax administration does not
observe types ι, individuals are requested to report them, e.g. by filling in an income
tax form. We denote such reports by eι. Then, following the enforcement policy

8

Measurability issues arise in probability spaces with a continuum of iid random variables, as it is the
case in our setting. In spite of this, we will adopt throughout the paper the usual abuse of the Law of
Large Numbers. Hence µ also represents the proportion of rich individuals in the population.
9
Utilities that are linear in the public good have been recently adopted in the public economics literature.
For example, Ray and Vohra (2001) and Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006) use them in models of public goods
provision, albeit in other contexts.
10
This social welfare function has been studied theoretically by Ledyard and Palfrey (1999), and used, in
a more applied context, by Laﬀont and Martimort (2005). This criterion is especially interesting because,
as α adopts values between 0 and 1, it describes a family of standardly used social welfare functions. In
particular, when α = 0, the social welfare function is Rawlsian; whereas, when α = 1, it is utilitarian.
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previously designed by the government, the tax administration audits each report eι
with probability πhι .

Each audit costs C = c(I, δ) ≥ 0, where δ is a positive parameter. Let C0 = c(0, δ)
denote the initial audit cost, before an investment decision has been made. This
level C0 is an exogenous function of the stock of capital the tax administration is
endowed with at the beginning of the first stage and/or other exogenous parameters
that are related to the diﬃculty in auditing (e.g. the percentage of farmers in the
population).11 The main assumption of the paper is the following: the audit cost
decreases with investment I, at a decreasing rate. This is precisely the meaning that
the expression ‘modernization of the tax administration’ has in our paper. Formally,
the audit cost function c verifies12
cI < 0, cII > 0 and lim C = 0
I→∞

The cost function c also verifies that the higher the parameter δ, the higher the
capacity of any level of investment to reduce the initial audit cost: cδ < 0. This is
why we call δ the ‘investment productivity’.
When a taxpayer is not audited, he pays the tax that corresponds to his report eι.13
But if he is audited, the tax administration discovers his true type ι. And, if a
misreport is detected, the evader has to pay the tax that he legally owes plus the
additional fine f.14 With all revenues collected (taxes and fines, net of investment
and audit costs), the government finances the provision of the public good G, which
has a unit cost equal to p.
The assumptions of the model and its timing deserve some comments.
To simplify the model15 , we assume that the government makes all the decisions. The
tax administration is simply a ‘machine’ that follows the government’s directives, unlike
in Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990) and in Sanchez and Sobel (1993), where the
tax administration decides the audit strategy. In spite of this, and for the sake of realism,
we follow these authors in separating (only formally) the tax administration from the
government.
Regarding full commitment to the enforcement policy, this assumption generates a
framework where, a priori, investments have the lowest value (i.e. they do not have a
commitment value). We could have adopted two other assumptions: partial commitment [Melumad and Mookherjee (1989)] or no commitment [Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde
(1986)]. These other assumptions, although more realistic, do not enrich the model substantially. In fact, they unnecessarily complicate the computations, without modifying
11

It is well known that auditing income generated in agricultural activities is very diﬃcult, either in
developed or developing countries.
12
Throughout the paper, subscripts of functions denote partial derivatives.
13
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that tax collection is costless, both for taxpayers and for the tax
administration.
14
Like Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín (1997) and Chander and Wilde (1998), we rule out of the model
rewards for truthful reports.
15
Vakneen and Yitzhaki (1989) comment on the necessity of simplifying this kind of problems.
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qualitatively the main results regarding the optimality of investing to modernize the tax
administration.
Concerning the investment decision, two observations can be made. First, and related
to the previous comment, the fact that the government chooses the investment’s level
replicates the US Congress creating an special account for the IRS, with funds to be used
only for the modernization of the IRS’s information technology. Second, the lag between
the investment decision and then the design of the tax law is clearly a shortcut, reflecting
the long-term character of these investments (made once, with an impact that carries over
many years) with respect of the sort-term of the tax law (designed yearly).
The reason for assuming that the government taxes only the rich and that individual welfares are quasi-linear in the public good is purely technical. The first assumption
enables us to obtain necessary and suﬃcient conditions to characterize the optimal tax
law analytically.16 In the next section, we explain why this assumption is not, in fact, so
restrictive. The second assumption is suﬃcient to guarantee non-ambiguos signs in the
comparative statics analysis at the second stage. In turn, all this is necessary to obtain
any result regarding the optimal level of investment, at the first stage.
Finally, we do not follow the literature that considers that ‘the punishment should fit
the crime’. In our model, the government can choose any fine, with no restriction other
than limited liability. This rules out of the model the beckerian-type result ‘hanging evaders
with probability zero’.
The goal of the paper is to characterize the optimal fiscal policy, which is the 4-uple
{I, t, f, πhι }. Before doing that, and in order to have a benchmark, we present the optimal
fiscal policy under full information. In this case, the tax administration observes incomes
and thus audits are useless. Anticipating this, the government does not need to invest in
the tax administration and simply sets the tax that solves the following problem, where
private consumption has been replaced, using the taxpayers’ budget constraint, by their
disposable income
⎧
Max αµu(y − t) + G
⎪
⎪
t,G
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ subject to
∗
P
0≤t
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
t≤y
(LL)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
pG = µt
(B)

We denote by (LL) the limited liability constraint and by (B), the government’s budget
constraint. The following expressions
αuq (y − t∗ ) =
1
αuq (y) >
p

1
if t∗ > 0
p

(1)

otherwise

16

In more general models, Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990) and Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky
(2004) have to do numerical simulations to completely characterize the optimal tax law.
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characterize the optimal full information tax t∗ . On the one hand, when uq (y) ≤ 1/αp, the
government taxes the rich in order to equalize their social marginal utility of consumption
with the social marginal utility of the last $ spent in the public good. On the other hand,
when uq (y) > 1/αp, taxation is too costly in welfare terms and thus t∗ = 0. We denote by
G∗ = µt∗ /p the optimal provision of public good.

3

Optimal fiscal policy under asymmetric information

In this section, we characterize the optimal fiscal policy under asymmetric information,
when the tax administration can only observe incomes at a cost, by auditing reports. In
order to do this, we solve the model backwardly.

3.1

The optimal tax law

The government can commit to the audit probability πhι when it designs the tax law; thus,
the Revelation Principle applies. Hence, the optimal tax law can be easily characterized
adopting a mechanism design approach. According to Mookherjee and Png (1989), the tax
administration does not need to audit a taxpayer that has reported to be rich. From now
on, π will denote the probability of auditing an announcement eι = p. The optimal tax law
(t, f, π) solves the following problem, where again private consumptions have been replaced
by taxpayers’ disposable income, but now at each possible final state.
⎧
Max αµu(y − t) + G
⎪
⎪
t,f,π,G
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
subject to
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
0≤t
P1
⎪
⎪
t+f ≤y
(LL0 )
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
u (y − t) ≥ πu (y − t − f ) + (1 − π) u (y) (IC)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
pG = µt − (1 − µ)πC − I
(B 0 )

Now we denote by (LL0 ) the after audit limited liability constraint17 and by (IC), the
incentive compatibility constraint.18 With respect to the full information setting, the government’s budget constraint (B 0 ) now incorporates the aggregate audit cost (1 − µ)πC and
the investment I.19 As it is usual in this kind of models, the fine f does not enter in the
maximand of the problem P1 because it has only a deterrent role.
17

As f ≥ 0, imposing after audit limited liability constraint also ensures t ≤ y.
Since the number of taxpayers is very large, none of them considers the impact of their non-compliance
with the tax law on the amount of public good. So the public good does not appear in the incentivecompatibility constraint.
19
Without any loss of generality, we do not impose the net tax collection to be (weakly) positive because
this should hold at the optimum. If this were not the case, it is straightforward to realize that not
investing in the tax administration or not taxing the rich (and thus not enforcing the tax law) would
dominate, making the net tax collection to be in fact (weakly) positive.
18
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At the optimum, (LL0 ) binds: increasing the fine f up to its maximal legal level y − t
relaxes (IC). Moreover, as in other Principal-Agent models of tax-enforcement policies
[e.g. Mookherjee and Png (1989)], (IC) also binds. The government sets an audit strategy
u (y − t)
u (y)

π =1−

such that a potential evader is indiﬀerent between truthfully reporting his type and misreporting. Computing the first-order condition of the problem P1 and rearranging, we obtain
the expression that characterizes the optimal tax at an interior solution
∙
¸
(1 − µ)C
1
1−
(2)
αuq (y − t) =
p
(1 − µ)C + αµpu (y)
Under asymmetric information, the taxpayers’ social marginal utility of consumption again
equals the social marginal utility of the expenditure in the public good. Now, due to the
necessity of auditing reports in order to collect taxes, this expenditure is less than the tax
collection. Therefore, by concavity of the utility function u, the optimal tax t is downwardly
distorted with respect to the optimal full information tax t∗ . We gather these results in the
next proposition, where we completely characterize the optimal tax and audit probability.
In particular, we explain in detail how the solutions vary with the audit cost C because
this will be useful in the next section.
Proposition 1 Let C =
two regimes emerge.

[1 − αpuq (y)]µu(y)
. Under asymmetric information, the following
(1 − µ)uq (y)

• Regime RA : when C < C, the optimal tax t and the optimal audit probability π are
continuous and strictly decreasing functions of C that satisfy
lim t = t∗

,

C→0

and
lim π = π Max = 1 −

C→0

lim t = 0
C→C

u (y − t∗ )
u (y)

,

lim π = 0.
C→C

• Regime RN A : when C ≥ C, the government does not tax and the tax administration
does not audit.
Under regime RA , the optimal tax is below t∗ and decreases with the audit cost C.
In order to understand why, let’s assume first that C = 0. The government sets the full
information optimal tax t∗ , charges the tax administration to audit with probability π Max
and to punish evaders with the fine f = y − t∗ . Now consider an increase in the audit cost
C. This makes the aggregate audit cost (1 − µ)πC to increase, causing a decrease in the
provision of the public good, with its consequent welfare loss. What should be the optimal
reaction of the government? To reduce the tax t and to increase the fine f , while keeping
their sum constant, equal to y. Even if this change reduces the tax collection and, a priori,
9

decreases further the provision of the public good, it has two other eﬀects that attenuate
the above mentioned welfare loss. First, the decrease in t reduces the stake for evasion.
Therefore, π can decrease from π Max , countering the impact of the initial increase in C on
the aggregate audit cost. Second, reducing the tax makes private consumption of the rich
to increase. A similar argument can be used to explain why the distortion t∗ − t increases
with the audit cost C.
This is not the end of the story. For a ‘suﬃciently high’ value of the audit cost C,
namely C, the optimal tax t converges to 0. Then, when C ≥ C, regime RNA emerges: the
audit cost is so high that enforcement is prohibitive, thus π = 0. Under this regime, the
unique incentive-compatible tax is 0 and the fine is irrelevant. So, no redistribution takes
place.
These results are similar to those obtained by Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (2004).
Besides the optimality of maximal fines and the characterization of the optimal audit
probability from the binding incentive-compatibility constraint, we find the same regimes20
and we confirm analytically their numerical comparative statics results (see their Table
1). Therefore, as our model qualitatively replicates the optimal tax law found in their
more general setting, our assumption regarding not taxing the poor does not seem to be so
restrictive as one could have initially thought.
Finally, the optimal provision of public good G is also a continuous and strictly decreasing function of C that satisfy
lim G = G∗ and lim G = 0

C→0

C→C

When tax evasion is an issue, the provision of public good G is below the full information
level G∗ . Falkinger (1991) does not find such a clear-cut result because his model is more
general.

3.2

The optimal investment

In the first stage, anticipating its future fiscal choices, the government chooses whether to
invest to modernize its tax administration and, if so, how much to invest. This decision
has two diﬀerent impacts. On the one hand, it aﬀects the expected social welfare because
the government allocates tax revenues to investment I instead of allocating them to the
public good G. On the other hand, as investment changes the value of the audit cost C,
this decision can also fix under which regime the government will design the tax law and
the tax administration will operate. In order to address the choice of regime in terms of
the variable I, let I denote the solution of the implicit equation c(I, δ) = C.21 Thus, the
20

Unlike Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (2004), we have to derive a formal expression of the threshold C
because it will play a crucial role in the analysis of the first stage of the model.
21
Due to the properties of the cost function c, I is unique.
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expected welfare can now be written as a function of investment I, as follows
when C0 ≤ C EW =
when C0 > C EW =

EW A = αµu(y − t) +

⎧
NA
⎪
= αµu(y)
⎨ EW

1
[µt − (1 − µ) πC − I] for I ≥ 0
p
for I = 0

1
⎪
⎩ EW A = αµu(y − t) + [µt − (1 − µ) πC − I] if I ≥ I > 0
p
(3)
where the superscripts indicate the corresponding regime. The expression of EW NA takes
into account that, as the government raises no tax revenues, investment in the tax administration cannot be aﬀorded. As we can see, the value of the initial audit cost C0 is now
important to characterize the expected welfare. When C0 ≤ C, only regime RA emerges
because, no matter the investment decision, C ≤ C. This is not the case when C0 > C :
according to the value of the investment, both regimes RNA or RA can occur.
In order to solve for the optimal investment, we proceed as follows. First, we find
the investment that maximizes EW A . If it exists, we denote it by IA . Second, when it is
pertinent to do so, we compare EW A (IA ) with EW NA to take the overall maximum.
Under regime RA , the optimal investment IA is the solution to the following problem
⎧
1
⎪
⎪
Max αµu(y − t) + [µt − (1 − µ) πC − I]
⎪
⎪
I
p
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
subject to
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
u (y − t(C))
t = t(C) , π = π(C) = 1 −
P2
u (y)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
C
=
c(I,
δ)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
max{0, I} ≤ I
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ I ≤ µt − (1 − µ) πC

where t(C) and π(C) are the solutions to the problem P1 . From Proposition 1, they are
uniquely defined and continuous decreasing functions of the audit cost C. The last two
inequalities characterize the constraint set. The first inequality reflects that the lowest
value of I supporting regime RA is not unique because it depends upon the initial audit
cost C0 , as it is clear from (3). The second inequality shows the resource constraint of the
government, at this initial stage.
A general characterization of the solution to P2 is diﬃcult, for the following reasons.
First, when max{0, I} = I, the constraint set may be empty. Indeed, under some parameter configurations [e.g. high initial audit cost C0 and low investment productivity δ], no
investment fulfills the resource constraint. Second, even if the constraint set is non-empty
and we can prove that the problem P2 has a maximum, it is often diﬃcult to find it with
the usual techniques because the expected welfare EW A is not always concave in I and the
second-order condition, evaluated at the critical points, cannot be verified analytically.22
22

Investment I impacts the expected welfare EW A in many diﬀerent ways: (i) directly: through the
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Finally, even if one succeeds in identifying IA , the comparison between EW NA and
EW A (IA ) is not straightforward because it is a comparison of levels. All these diﬃculties23
push us to simulate the model in the next section.
But before doing that, we can prove the following results that apply when the optimal
investment I > 0.
Proposition 2 If the government invests a strictly positive amount of money to modernize
its tax administration, the optimal tax t, the optimal audit probability π and the level of
public good G are higher with respect to their level in a model without investment.
If the optimal investment is strictly positive, each audit costs less than C0 . Therefore,
by Proposition 1, the optimal tax and the optimal audit probability increase with respect to
their level in a model without investment. Intuitively, one could also expect the result about
G. However, this intuition must not be based on the simple observation that investment
reduces audit cost and thus, ceteris paribus, G increases. The point is that, as t increases
when investment is realized, optimality implies that the provision of the public good must
increase, to compensate for the lower consumption of taxpayers. Next, we present some
comparative statics results.
Proposition 3 If the government invests a strictly positive amount of money to modernize
its tax administration, the optimal investment I increases with taxable income y and with
the degree of aversion to inequality (1 − α), but decreases with the cost of the public good p.
With respect to the other parameters of the model, the change in the optimal investment I
is ambiguous.
An optimal investment I > 0 is characterized by the following expression
− (1 − µ) πcI = 1

(4)

where the lhs of (4) is the marginal saving in the aggregate audit cost [hereinafter MSAAC]
and the rhs, the marginal cost of investment [hereinafter MCI], which is always 1. From (4),
we can realize that the total eﬀect on the optimal investment of a change in one parameter
is the result from the combination of two potential eﬀects on the MSAAC. First, there is a
direct eﬀect that occurs when this parameter change aﬀects only (1 − µ) , π or cI . Second,
there is an indirect eﬀect provided this parameter change causes a variation in the optimal
tax t, making also the optimal audit probability π to change. So, if after a change in one
parameter the MSAAC is greater (lesser) than the MCI, the government restores optimality
by increasing (decreasing) the investment. Having this in mind, we explain in detail the
comparative statics results presented in the proposition.
budget constraint of the government, and (ii) indirectly: through C (whose degree of convexity depends
upon the retained functional specification for the relation C(I, δ)) and through the optimal values of t
and π (whose concavity or convexity in I depends upon the third derivative uqqq ). But, as there are no
convincing arguments (neither theoretical nor empirical) for either the form of C(I, δ) or the sign of uqqq ,
the concavity of the expected welfare EW A is, in fact, a numerical question. Hence, we can always find
functional specifications of C(I, δ) and u such that EW A is not concave in I, as Figure 1 depicts (see
below).
23
Illustrations of these technical diﬃculties can be obtained upon request from the authors.
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• When taxable income y increases, the two eﬀects have opposite signs. On the one
hand, the direct eﬀect in π is negative. The intuition for this result is as follows. For
a given tax t, the stake for evasion [i.e., the gain u(y) − u(y − t)] decreases when y
increases, due to the concavity of the utility function u. Therefore, in order to ensure
incentive compatibility, it is not necesary to audit so much, and thus the optimal
audit probability decreases. On the other hand, the indirect eﬀect is positive: an
increase in y enables the government to tax more and thus π increases. In spite of
this, the indirect eﬀect dominates and thus π increases. As the MSAAC increases,
the government optimally invests more.
• When the degree of aversion to inequality (1 − α) increases, there is only an indirect
eﬀect. Higher aversion to inequality makes the government to increase the tax. This
pushes the stake for evasion upwards and so π has to increase. As a consequence of
this, the MSAAC increases and thus I also optimally increases.
• When the cost of the public good p increases, there is only an indirect eﬀect: the
government prefers to tax less. Therefore, the stake for evasion diminishes and thus
π decreases, leading to a decrease in the MSAAC. So I optimally decreases.
• When either the investment productivity δ or the initial audit cost C0 increase, the
two eﬀects may appear. Specifically, in both cases, these eﬀects depend upon the sign
and the value of cIδ and cIC0 at the optimum. As there is no justification to assume a
priori any sign for these cross derivatives, the result will depend upon the particular
specification of the audit cost function C.
• Finally, when the fraction of rich individuals in the population µ increases, the two
eﬀects go in opposite directions. On the one hand, the direct eﬀect is clearly negative:
when µ increases, the MSAAC decreases. On the other hand, the indirect eﬀect is
positive: an increase in µ makes the government to tax more. As t increases, so do π
and the MSAAC. Hence the total eﬀect is ambiguous.

4

Numerical results

The numerical simulations of the model24 will help us in several ways: to identify parameter
configurations under which the optimal investment I > 0; in this case, to quantify the other
components of the optimal fiscal policy and to obtain or confirm the comparative statics
results presented in Proposition 3. Throughout these simulations, we adopt the following
functional specifications:
• Utility function:

1−γ
u(x) =
γ

µ

x
1−γ

24

¶γ

, with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1

We did more simulations than those presented here. But, for the sake of conciseness, we prefer to show
those whose results add novelty to the discussion. The simulations have been done with Matlab 7.0. All
codes and results are available upon request from the authors.
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The utility function is assumed to be isoelastic, as in Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky
(2004).
• Audit cost function

C0
, with 0 ≤ δ
1 + δI
This audit cost function generates cross eﬀects (i.e. cIδ and cIC0 are both non null).
This enables us to confirm that some of the comparative statics results found in
Proposition 3 can be ambiguous.
c(I, δ) =

We also adopt the following baseline parameters
y
γ
C0
δ
1−α µ p
100 0.5 120 0.22
0.5
0.4 1
Table 1: Baseline parameters
Before showing the results of the numerical simulations, the next figure illustrates why
the value of the optimal investment I can jump. Figure 1 draws, for diﬀerent levels of the
investment productivity δ, the expected welfare EW as a function of investment I.
Insert Figure 1 here
When δ increases, EW changes in two diﬀerent ways. First, the set of values of I that
verifies the resource constraint increases. That is the reason why the curves with the
two lowest levels of δ are not defined for all values of I. Second, the shape of the curves
changes, from a monotonic decreasing curve to a non-monotonic one. The consequence of
this change is immediate to see. When δ < 0.094, the optimal investment I = 0. When
δ = 0.094, two levels of I maximize the expected welfare but then, when δ increases, the
optimal investment I becomes strictly positive. Hence, due to the non-concavity of EW,
the optimal investment can be non-continuos in δ.
The next paragraphs explain in detail, with reference to the corresponding figures,
the impact of changes in one parameter on the endogenous variables of the model. Each
parameter varies within an interval that contains its baseline level. In the figures, solid
curves are obtained when investment is optimally chosen; dashed curves, when investment
in the tax administration is not allowed.

4.1

Change in the investment productivity when δ ∈ [0, 2]

Given our baseline parameters, C0 = 120 < C = 128.62. Hence, throughout this subsection,
only regime RA prevails. Figure 2(a) shows that, when δ < 0.094, the investment productivity is so low that it is too costly, in welfare terms, to invest to reduce the initial audit
cost C0 . Only when δ = 0.094, the government starts investing: I jumps upward, to 7.94.
This figure also confirms one of the ambiguous comparative statics results of Proposition 3:
the optimal investment I can be non monotonic in δ. When δ ∈ [0.094, 0.18], an increase in
δ makes the positive indirect eﬀect to dominate the negative direct eﬀect, because, due to
14

the fact that the audit cost is still high, t and π can increase a lot in relative terms. So the
MSAAC increases above the MCI, implying that I optimally increases. When δ = 0.18,
the optimal investment I = 10.64 is maximal. But then, as the investment productivity is
suﬃciently high, the indirect eﬀect is lower and the negative direct eﬀect starts dominating,
making the MSAAC to decrease below the MCI when δ increases. In other words, it becomes worthless to maintain the increasing profile of investment and so I starts to decrease.
This decrease is slow: δ has to increase more than 1000% to reduce I by 50%. In Figure
2(b), we can see that the audit cost is initially constant, and then, when I jumps upward,
it jumps downward to 68.71. After this point, and despite the non-monotonicity of I, C
monotonically decreases with δ. When δ ∈ [0.094, 0.18], the combined increases in δ and I
push the audit cost downward. When δ > 0.18, the increase in δ exceeds the decrease in I
and thus C continues to decrease, although at a slow rate. At the end, C decreases 83.53%,
even more than I. In Figure 2(c), we observe that, when C = C0 , the government sets a
low tax t = 12.51. When C jumps downward, t jumps upward and sharply, to 73.07. Then t
monotonically increases 35%. Similarly, in Figure 2(d), π jumps upward at δ = 0.094, from
0.065 to 0.48. Then, π monotonically increases 84%, more than the increase in t. In Figure
2(e), the aggregate audit cost AAC is initially constant at 4.65, jumps upward to 18.61
and then monotonically decreases, to reach 5.64. From Figures 2(a) and 2(e), we realize
that investment and enforcement expenditures are substitutes when δ ∈ [0.094, 0.18] and
then, when δ > 0.18, they are complements. In Figure 2(f), the expenditure in the public
good EP G jumps upward at δ = 0.094, from 0.35 to 2, and then monotonically increase, to
reach 28.7. Figure 2(g) illustrates the eﬃciency of the public sector EP S. This percentage
measures how much of the tax collection is used to provide public goods. EP S shows an
imperceptible downward jump (from 6.99% to 6.86%) and then monotonically increases, to
attain 72.67%. Surprisingly, from δ = 0.094, the investment productivity δ has to increase
almost 448% in order to make the expenditure in the public good reach more than 50% of
the expected tax collection.
Insert Figures 2 here

4.2

Change in the initial audit cost when C0 ∈ [0, 300]

In Figure 3(a), when C0 < 8, the initial cost C0 is so low that, even under regime RA ,
it does not pay in welfare terms to invest in the tax administration. So the optimal
investment I = 0 and thus the audit cost C = C0 , which is obviously increasing in this
parameter. When C0 = 8, the government starts investing because, as C0 is relatively high,
the MSAAC is now equal to the MCI. Contrary to the previous simulations, the optimal
investment does not jump upward at this point. Then I increases with C0 , although at a
decreasing rate. Thus, the increase in C0 dominates the increase in I, yielding the audit
cost to increase from 0 to 51.6, as we can see in Figure 3(b). But, when C0 = 203, it
becomes too expensive, again in welfare terms, to invest to attenuate the increase in the
audit cost. Hence, investment vanishes, from its maximum 13.34. This yields an upward
jump in the audit cost C, from 51.6 to 203. At this point, the audit cost verifies C > C and
thus regime RN A emerges onwards. Figure 3(c) shows that the optimal tax t decreases,
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from t∗ = 99.87 and reaches 82.17; and, when C0 = 203, it also vanishes. The optimal audit
probability π is also decreasing, starting from πMax = 0.965 and attaining 0.58, then when
C0 = 203, π also jumps downward to 0. Figure 3(e) shows that the aggregate audit cost
increases, to reach 17.88. Clearly, the amount of money spent in the public good decreases
with C0 , from 39.95, to reach a minimum of 1.64, at C0 = 203. Figure 3(g) depicts the
EP S, which obviously starts at 100% and then monotonically decreases, to attain 5%.25
Insert Figures 3 here

4.3

Change in the proportion of rich individuals when µ ∈ [0, 1]

When the proportion of rich individuals µ < 0.31, C is very low. Given the baseline
parameters C0 and δ, a great investment would be necessary to make C < C. In fact, such
an amount of resources is prohibitive, so I = 0. In other words, there are so many poor
that the aggregate audit cost would be very high. Hence, it does not pay to enforce the
tax law and thus regime RNA emerges. When µ = 0.31, I jumps upward to 10.09. As C
jumps downward, regime RNA shifts towards regime RA . Figure 4(a) also confirms that the
optimal investment I can be non monotonic with respect to µ. From µ = 0.31, I increases
with µ. As there are relatively more rich in the population, the government increases the
tax (with the consequent increase in the optimal audit probability π). Hence, the indirect
eﬀect oﬀsets the direct eﬀect and so the MSAAC increases, making the government to invest
more. When µ = 0.39, optimal investment is maximal (I = 10.51). Then, if µ increases,
the direct eﬀect starts dominating. As there are fewer poor, the MSAAC decreases below
the MCI, making I to monotonically decrease. When µ = 0.96, then I = 0 again. There
are almost no poor, so the aggregate audit cost becomes negligible. So does the MSAAC
and thus investment is worthless, even under regime RA . Concerning the audit cost C, it is
inversely related to I : first C jumps downward from C0 = 120 to 37.51, then it decreases
slightly to reach 36.22 at µ = 0.39 and finally, it increases to attain again C0 . In Figure
4(c), under regime RNA , t = 0; then t jumps upward to 80.98. After that, the eﬀect of
an increase in µ prevails over the eﬀect through the increase in the audit cost C. Hence,
t monotonically increases and converges to t∗ . The optimal audit probability π behaves
similarly in Figure 4(d). First, π jumps upward, from 0 to 0.56; then it increases to reach
π Max = 0.965. Figure 4(e) shows that the aggregate audit cost presents a similar profile
than the optimal investment I: it increases from 14.46 to 15.06 and then decreases. The
expenditure in the public good monotonically increases, from 0 to the maximum 99.87
when µ = 1. Figure 4(g) shows that the EPS increases.26
Insert Figures 4 here
25

As there is no tax collection when C0 > 203, EP S is not defined for such values of the initial audit
cost.
26
As there is no tax collection when µ < 0.31, EP S is not defined for such values of the fraction of rich
in the population.
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4.4

Change in taxable income when y ∈ [0, 200]

When taxable income y < 75, C is very low. So, due to the baseline parameters, it is very
likely that C > C. In other words, the taxable income is so low, with respect to the audit
cost, that it does not pay to enforce the tax law and thus regime RNA emerges. In that
case, I = 0. But when y increases, so does C. Hence, when y = 75, there is a shift of regimes
and the government starts investing in the tax administration: I jumps upward to 8.92.
Then I increases with y, to reach 12.16. The indirect eﬀect, which makes the government
to increase the tax (with the consequent increase in π) always oﬀsets the direct eﬀect (that
makes π to decrease). So the MSAAC increases, making the government to invest more,
albeit slightly. Indeed, from y = 75, an increase of 166.7% in taxable income only induces
the government to invest 36.3% more. Concerning the audit cost C, it is inversely related
to I, as we can see in Figure 5(b). First C jumps downward, from C0 = 120 to 40.5 and
then it decreases slowly, to attain 32.65. Regarding the optimal tax, only when y = 75 the
government starts taxing the rich (t = 60.08). Then, the optimal tax monotonically and
sharply increases 388%, converging to t∗ (which is also increasing in y). Even if it is diﬃcult
to observe directly from Figure 5(c), optimal taxes are indeed progressive, with and without
investment. But clearly t/y is higher with investment. In Figure 5(d), π jumps upward from
0 to 0.554 and then monotonically increases, to attain 0.85. The next two figures show the
public expenditures. Although the optimal investment increases, the increase in π is so
important that aggregate audit cost increases 24%. Also, the expenditure in the public
good increases with taxable income. Figure 5(g) shows that, despite the fact that the tax
collection increases (225%), the EPS increases, due to the sharp increase in the provision
of the public good.
Insert Figures 5 here

4.5

Summary of the numerical results

In this section, we present the main results from the numerical simulations. Figures 3, 4
and 5 show that for certain parameter values, regime RA emerges whereas, when investment
is absent, the government would not have enforced the tax law.
The simulations also clarify the relation between investment and expenditures in audit.
Although investment reduces the cost of each individual audit, it does not necessarily
decrease aggregate audit cost as one might expect. First, aggregate audit cost is sometimes
higher with investment than without it because regime RA can emerge, instead of regime
RNA . Second, even when Regime RA prevails without investment, I can make π to increase
too much, increasing aggregate audit cost, as we can see in Figure 2(e). Moreover, despite
the fact that investment and aggregate audit cost are complements most of the time, Figures
2(a) and 2(e) show that they could also be substitutes.
Also, the presence of optimal investment alters some comparative statics results of the
model, in particular those pertaining to the aggregate audit cost, as we can see in Figure
3(e).
Interestingly, the two diﬀerent ways of modifying the income distribution (i.e. changes
in µ or y) have not the same impact upon the optimal level of investment. Figure 5(a)
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confirms that I increases with taxable income, as shown in Proposition 3. But Figure 4(a)
shows that, with our baseline parameters, I is non-monotonic when the fraction of rich in
the population increases.
All simulations show that, as a consequence of the increase in the provision of the public
good, modernizing the tax administration makes the eﬃciency of the public sector taken as
a whole to increase. Again, this is not evident per se because the measure EP S, as defined
above, depends not only on the audit cost but also on the other endogenous variables of
the model.
Summing up, the simulations confirm that incorporating the modernization of the tax
administration in a model of optimal tax-enforcement policies modifies qualitatively its
results.

5

Conclusions

There is a large list of contributions that have analyzed optimal tax-enforcement policies
under the threat of tax evasion. Surprisingly, all assume that the audit cost function is
exogenously given. In practice, governments invest many resources to modernize their
tax administration and thus, to change audit costs. This paper is a first step towards
the incorporation, in the theory of optimal fiscal policies, of these investment decisions.
In a very simple model, we have been able to characterize the optimal tax-enforcement
policy, adopting a mechanism design approach. As many other contributions to the costlystate verification literature, the optimal fine for evaders is maximal and the optimal audit
probability is such that evasion is deterred. However, in order to attenuate the stake
for evasion, the government optimally distorts taxes downward, distortion with respect to
the full information optimal tax. Then we analyze the optimal investment. Although we
prove its existence, we cannot completely characterize the optimal investment in general.
When it is strictly positive, the levels of the tax, the audit probability and the public
good are higher than their respective levels without investment. Under this circumstance,
the optimal investment increases with taxable income and with the degree of aversion to
inequality, but decreases with the cost of the public good.
To identify the solutions and to study how the optimal investment interacts with the
other components of the optimal fiscal policy, we simulate numerically the model. The
simulations clarify the relation between investment and expenditures in audit, showing
that, with investment, the aggregate audit cost may be higher than without investment.
Moreover, these two endogenous variables of the model can be substitutes or complements.
All simulations show that the public sector becomes more eﬃcient with investment: the
fraction of tax collection used to provide public goods increases. Summing up, the analythical results of the model and the simulations suggest the need to incorporate the kind
of investment analyzed here into the currently definitions of ‘tax eﬀort’ used in empirical
work.
The model can be extended in several directions. First, it could be interesting to
consider that the information gathering area of the tax administration faces a more general
audit cost function, with fixed and variable costs. With such a cost structure, investment
18

can have diﬀerent impacts (e.g. to increase the fixed cost while decreasing the variable
cost). Second, it would be useful to study how the results change if an audit discovers the
true income with some probability, probability that is determined by the initial investment.
Third, the model can be extended dynamically, to analyze the path of the diﬀerent elements
of the optimal fiscal policy. Fourth, our analysis can be generalized to incorporate more
than two levels of income or more dimensions of heterogeneity (e.g., diﬀerent degrees of
risk aversion). Then one could think to calibrate an optimal tax-enforcement model with
empirically founded parameters, and then to proceed by adding investments to modernize
the tax administration into the simulations. Finally, the model generates some testable
implications. All these are interesting venues for future research.
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6

Appendix

6.1

Characterization of the optimal tax law (t, f, π)
First-order condition

Formally, the government solves the following problem
⎧
Max αµu(y − t) + G
⎪
⎪
t,f,π,G
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
subject to
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
0≤t
P1
⎪
⎪
t+f ≤y
(LL0 )
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ u (y − t) ≥ πu (y − t − f ) + (1 − π) u (y) (IC)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
pG = µt − (1 − µ)πC − I
(B 0 )

At the optimum, (LL0 ) binds: increasing the fine f up to its maximal legal level relaxes the
incentive compatibility constraint, with no other impact in the aggregate welfare. Moreover,
as it is usual in Principal-Agent models of tax enforcement-policies like Mookherjee and
Png (1989), (IC) also binds: the government sets an audit strategy that makes a potential
evader to be indiﬀerent between truthfully reporting his type and misreporting. From this
binding constraint and replacing f by y − t, we can obtain the value of the optimal audit
probability, as follows
u (y − t)
π =1−
u (y)
Moreover, we can also obtain the value of G from (B 0 ). So, replacing π and G, the maximand
of P1 becomes
µ
∙
¸
¶
1
u (y − t)
αµu(y − t) +
µt − (1 − µ) 1 −
C −I
(5)
p
u (y)
which is a strictly concave function of t.27
Diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to t, we obtain the necessary and suﬃcient first-order
condition that characterizes an interior optimal tax t, as follows
∙
¸
1
(1 − µ)C
αuq (y − t) =
1−
(6)
p
(1 − µ)C + αµpu (y)
By strict concavity of (5), the optimal tax is unique. Moreover, as the utility function u is
concave, the optimal tax verifies t ≤ t∗ .
27

Indeed, the second derivative of (5) with respect to t is
µ
¶
(1 − µ)C
uqq (y − t) αµ +
<0
µu(y)
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Comparative statics
By the Maximum theorem [Berge (1963)], the optimal tax t is a continuous function of
C, and so are π and f. In order to completely characterize the optimal tax law (t, f, π),
∂t
. From (6), we can apply the Implicit Function theorem and show that
let’s compute
∂C
∂t
µ(1 − µ)u(y)
∂π
∂π ∂t
uq (y − t) ∂t
=
<0
=
=
<0
∂C
S
∂C
∂t ∂C
u(y) ∂C
µ
¶
∂G
αµ2 pu(y)
∂t
=
− (1 − µ) < 0
∂C
(1 − µ)C + αµpu(y) ∂C

(7)

where S = uqq (y − t).[(1 − µ)C + αµpu(y)]2 . We can also compute28
∂t
p [µu (y)]2
=
<0
∂α
S

∂π
∂π ∂t
=
<0
∂α
∂t ∂α

∂t
−u (y) C
=
>0
∂µ
S

∂π
∂π ∂t
=
>0
∂µ
∂t ∂µ

∙
¸
−1
µ(1 − µ)uq (y)C
∂t
=
− uqq (y − t) > 0
∂y
uqq (y − t) [(1 − µ)C + αµpu(y)]2
∂π ∂π ∂t
−uq (y − t) µ(1 − µ)uq (y)C u(y − t)uq (y)
dπ
=
+
=
+
>0
dy
∂y
∂t ∂y
u (y)
S
[u (y)]2
∂t
α [µu (y)]2
=
<0
∂p
S

dπ
∂π ∂t
=
<0
dp
∂t ∂p

Domain of positive taxation
Let’s find the parametric region (with respect to the audit cost C) where t ≥ 0. From
(6), we can find the value C that generates the limit case t = 0. This value is implicitly
characterized by the following expression
∙
¸
(1 − µ)C
1
αuq (y) =
1−
p
(1 − µ)C + αµpu (y)
After some manipulations, we obtain
C=
28

[1 − αpuq (y)]µu(y)
(1 − µ)uq (y)

The eﬀects of the parametric changes on f have the opposite signs than the analyzed eﬀects on t.
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Finally, with all these results, we can easily derive that lim t = t∗ and lim t = 0.
C→0

C→C

Moreover, it is straightforward to see that
lim f = y − t∗

C→0

and

lim π = π Max ≡ 1 −

C→0

lim G = G∗

C→0

6.2

and

lim f = 0
C→C

u(y − t∗ )
u(y)

and

lim π = 0
C→C

lim G = 0
C→C

Characterization of an (interior) optimal investment IA

Here, we adopt a parametric configuration such that the constraint set is not empty. Under
this circumstance, the constraint set is clearly bounded by 0 and µt∗ (i.e. the tax collection
under full information). Moreover, this set is also closed because it is defined by weak
inequalities and the functions t(C) and π(C) are continuos in I. Hence, the constraint set
is compact. In addition, the maximand in P2 is also continuos in I. So, by the Weierstrass
theorem [Takayama (1985)], the problem P2 has a maximum.
First-order condition
To find the (interior) optimal investment IA , the government solves the following problem
⎧
1
⎪
⎪
Max αµu(y − t) + [µt − (1 − µ) πC − I]
⎪
⎪
I
p
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
subject to
P2
⎪
⎪
u (y − t(C))
⎪
⎪
t
=
t(C)
,
π
=
π(C)
=
1
−
⎪
⎪
u (y)
⎪
⎪
⎩ C = c(I, δ)
The first-order condition for an interior solution of problem P2 is given by
µ
∙
µ
¶¸¶
∂EW A
∂t
uq (y − t)
1
=
cI −αµuq (y − t) +
µ − (1 − µ)C
∂I
∂C
p
u(y)
{z
}
|
A

(8)

1
− [(1 − µ)πcI + 1] = 0
p

Using (6), the term in parenthesis A vanishes, so we can rewrite (8) as
∂EW A
1
= − [(1 − µ) πcI + 1] = 0
∂I
p
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(9)

Comparative statics
¶
∂π ∂t
From (9) and assuming that Z = − (1 − µ)
(cI )2 + πcII < 0 (i.e. that the
∂t ∂C
solution verifies second-order condition), we can apply the Implicit Function theorem and
compute
µ

∙

¸
∂π ∂t
(1 − µ)
cδ cI + πcIδ
∂I
∂t ∂C
=
≷0
∂δ
Z
∂π ∂t
(1 − µ)
cI − πcI
∂I
∂t ∂µ
=
≷0
∂µ
Z

∂I
=
∂α

∙

¸
∂π ∂t
(1 − µ)
cC cI + πcIC0
∂I
∂t ∂C 0
≷0
=
∂C0
Z
µ

∂π ∂π ∂t
(1 − µ)
+
∂I
∂y
∂t ∂y
=
∂y
Z

∂π ∂t
cI
∂t ∂α < 0
Z

(1 − µ)

∂I
=
∂p
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∂π ∂t
cI
∂t ∂p
<0
Z

(1 − µ)

¶

cI
>0
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Figure 1: Jumps in the optimal investment
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